# Optimal Key Ranking Procedures in a Statistical Cryptanalysis

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#### Introduction

★ A typical problem for a cryptanalyst: try to find something "deviant" in a cryptographic primitive.

Another typical problem: try to distinguish *efficiently* the (sub-) key(s) which makes deviate the primitive the most.



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# Introduction (2)

- ★ In this talk: we are interested in certain settings of the second problem.
- ★ One can view this problem in a more general way than the cryptographic one.

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# Introduction (3)

- ★ Goal: apply statistical concepts to well-known cryptanalytic techniques.
- ★ Result: one can prove optimality results.
- \* Interestingly, this has practical applications !

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#### **Statistical Tests**

- \*  $D_0$  and  $D_1$ , two different probability distributions defined on the same finite set  $\mathcal{X}$ .
- ★ Given an element  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  (modeled by a random variable denoted X) drawn according either to D<sub>0</sub> or to D<sub>1</sub>, one has to decide which is the case.

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#### Statistical Tests (2)

★ One uses a decision rule

$$\delta:\mathcal{X} \to \{0,1\}$$

taking a sample of X as input and defining what should be the guess for each possible  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ .

★ Two different types of error probabilities:

$$\alpha \triangleq \Pr_{X_0}[\delta(X) = 1]$$
  
$$\beta \triangleq \Pr_{X_1}[\delta(X) = 0]$$

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#### Statistical Tests (3)

A Swiss instance of the problem: in 1992, Swiss people had to vote whether they wanted to become European or not.



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# Statistical Tests (4)

- ★ It was possible to separate the Swiss (voting) population in two categories according to a simple criterion.
  - 1. In one part of the voters, a big majority was in favour of becoming European.
  - 2. In the other part of the voters, a big majority was in favour of not becoming European.
- ★ Question: given a random Swiss citizen, what is the best way to decide whether (s)he voted YES or NO become an European ?

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### Statistical Tests (5)

- In statistics, one calls this type of decision a binary hypothesis test (or simple hypothesis test).
- In fact, each of these hypotheses completely specifies the probability distributions.
- \* An hypothesis test which is not simple is called composite hypothesis test. For instance, a  $\chi^2$ -test is a composite test.

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#### Statistical Tests (6)

- \* The decision rule  $\delta$  defines a partition of  $\mathcal{X}$  in two disjoint subsets  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\overline{\mathcal{A}}$ .
- The optimal decision rule is given by the Neyman-Pearson Lemma based on the *likelihood-ratio*:

$$\mathcal{A} \triangleq \left\{ x \in \mathcal{X} : \frac{\Pr_{X \leftarrow \mathsf{D}_0}[x]}{\Pr_{X \leftarrow \mathsf{D}_1}[x]} \ge \tau \right\}$$
(1)

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#### Statistical Tests (7)

#### **Definition 1 (Optimal Binary Hypothesis Test)**

To test  $X \leftarrow D_0$  against  $X \leftarrow D_1$ , choose a constant  $\tau > 0$ depending on  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  and define the likelihood ratio

$$\operatorname{Ir}(x) \triangleq \frac{\operatorname{Pr}_{X \leftarrow \mathsf{D}_0}[x]}{\operatorname{Pr}_{X \leftarrow \mathsf{D}_1}[x]}$$

The optimal decision function is then defined by

$$\delta_{\text{opt}} \triangleq \begin{cases} 0 & (i.e \text{ accept } X \leftarrow \mathsf{D}_0) & \text{if } \mathsf{lr}(x) \ge \tau \\ 1 & (i.e. \text{ accept } X \leftarrow \mathsf{D}_1) & \text{if } \mathsf{lr}(x) < \tau \end{cases}$$

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#### Statistical Tests (8)

Back to the Swiss instance of the problem: let us assume that our first hypothesis is "voted YES"; a likelihood-ratio decision rule could have been "*Is your mothertongue French ?*".

- $\alpha \equiv$  probability that a frenchspeaking Swiss citizen voted NO.
- $\beta \equiv$  probability that a german-speaking, italian-speaking or rumantsch-speaking Swiss citizen voted YES.



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#### **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures**

- Linear Cryptanalysis: generic technique invented by Matsui in 1993 in an application to DES. Refined and implemented in 1994.
- $\star$  Principles: Find  $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}$  and  $\mathbf{c}$  such that

$$\mathbf{a} \cdot X + \mathbf{b} \cdot C(X) = \mathbf{c} \cdot K$$

is probabilistically biased.

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#### **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (2)**

With full-DES (16 rounds), take the best 14-rounds linear characteristic, then decrypt the first and last rounds with subkey candidates.



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# **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (3)**

- ★ For each subkey candidate, count the number of times that the linear approximation is equal to 0, given all the plaintext and ciphertext pairs ( $N \approx 2^{43}$  for DES)
- \* If there is enough plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the good subkey candidate should deviate the most from  $\frac{N}{2}$ .
- Search exhaustively for the remaining missing key bits for the best candidate.

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# **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (4)**

- 1: Prepare *m* counters  $u_i, 1 \leq i \leq m$  and initialize them to 0.
- 2: for all Known plaintext-ciphertext pairs at disposal do
- 3: for all Subkey candidates do
- 4: Decrypt the first and last rounds and evaluate the linear expression.
- 5: **if** It evaluates to 0 **then**
- 6: Increment the corresponding counter
- 7: end if
- 8: end for
- 9: end for
- 10: Output the subkey candidate corresponding to the most biased counter as the right one.

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# **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (5)**

- ★ Data complexity: the number N of needed known plaintextciphertext pairs.
- Computational complexity: the number of DES evaluations during the exhaustive search part.
- ★ Key ranking was introduced in 1994 Matsui's paper; instead of taking the most biased, take the *l* most biased and search them one after the other for the remaining unknown bits.

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# **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (6)**

- ★ Ranking strategy ?
- ★ Intuitive way (the one in Matsui's paper): rank them from the highest to the smallest bias.
- ★ Is it optimal in terms of computational complexity ?

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# **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (7)**

- Neyman-Pearson Ranking Procedure: if probability distributions modelling the subkeys are available, one can rank the candidates by decreasing likelihood-ratio.
- Under reasonable hypotheses, they are known in the case of a linear cryptanalysis [Jun01].

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# **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (8)**

- One can show that this ranking procedure is optimal in terms of computational complexity.
- Matsui's ranking procedure is equivalent to a Neyman-Pearson Ranking Procedure (and thus optimal).

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#### **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (9)**

 More interesting problem: Matsui's refined attack (1994) uses two linear approximations involving disjoint key bits subsets.

Matsui's proposition (based on intuition): rank them independantly following their bias, and then build a single list sorted by increasing product of ranks.



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### **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (10)**

- \* Interestingly, one can easily use a NP-Ranking Procedure.
- ★ Optimal in terms of computational complexity.

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#### **Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (11)**

 $\star$  In the case of DES, the likelihood-ratio is given by

$$\mu_{(\ell_1,\ell_2)} = 2e^{-2n\epsilon^2} \cdot \cosh(4\epsilon\Sigma_{\ell_1}) \cdot \cosh(4\epsilon\Sigma_{\ell_2})$$
(2)

★ Taylor approximation:

$$\mu_{(\ell_1,\ell_2)} \approx 2 + (16\Sigma_{\ell_1}^2 + 16\Sigma_{\ell_2}^2 - 4n)\epsilon^2 + O(\epsilon^4)$$
 (3)

\* Simple to implement: sort by decreasing sum of the squares of the biases !

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# Optimal Key Ranking Procedures (12)

- ★ Experimental results on 21 linear cryptanalysis of DES: decrease of about 50 % of the computational complexity.
- $\star$  One can convert this gain in a decrease of N (about 31 %).
- \* A possible tradeoff: given  $2^{42.46}$  known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, it was possible to recover a complete DES key within  $2^{44.46}$  DES evaluations with a success probability equal to 85 %.

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#### Conclusion

- ★ Situations of binary hypothesis tests occurs very frequently in cryptography.
- Using concepts of statistics, one can design optimal distinguishing procedures.

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# THANK YOU !

