

Obfuscator-LLVM

-

Software Obfuscation for the Masses

area41 // Zürich // 02-06-2014

Who?

Who?

- *Pascal Junod (@cryptopathe)*, Julien Rinaldini (@pyknite), Johan Wehrli (@jowehrli) // HEIG-VD
- Julie Michielin // Kudelski Security
- Several bachelor & master students

Why?

Black-Box Adversaries

- Play the security game according to the rules
- Interact with components according to the defined APIs
- Adversaries considered in most « provably-secure » schemes by cryptographers




Grey-Box Adversaries

- Adversaries looking to exploit additional « side-channel » information
 - Time
 - Power/EM leakage
 - Faults






White-Box Adversaries



- (Almost) completely master SW/HW
- Can read every memory
- Can disturb every computation at will

White-Box Adversaries

- Examples in real life:
 - DRM circumventing
 - License management scheme cracking
 - Rogue SW reverse engineering, IP stealing
 - Malware analysis
 - Interoperability work
 - Security audits



Attack Scenarios

- Reverse engineering
 - IP stealing, cryptographic secret extractions
- Code modification
- Code distribution

Main Motivations

- Bad guys use software protection all the time. Why not good guys?
- Performing research on automatic desobfuscation not always easy (costly commercial tools)
- No open-source C/C++ obfuscation tool available that is capable of performing code transformation

Problems



- Dual-use tools
- Example of the iOS 7 jailbreak Christmas drama
 - Obfuscated code
 - 0-day jailbreaking exploit ?
 - Bundled pirate app repository ?
 - See <http://crypto.junod.info/2013/12/24/about-obfuscator-llvm-dual-use-tools-and-academic-ethics/>
- How to audit a SW protection tool with respect to backdoor insertion?

What?

Software Protection

- Goals of software protection:

- Code more difficult to understand

- Code more difficult to modify

- Code more diverse

Obfuscation

The diagram consists of three blue speech bubbles. The first bubble, labeled 'Obfuscation', points to the goal 'Code more difficult to understand'. The second bubble, labeled 'Tamperproofing', points to the goal 'Code more difficult to modify'. The third bubble, labeled 'Watermarking', points to the goal 'Code more diverse'.

Tamperproofing

Watermarking


```
@P=split//,".URRUU\c8R";@d=split//,"\nrekcah  
xinU / lreP rehtona tsuJ";sub p{  
@p{"r$p","u$p"}=(P,P);pipe"r$p","u$p";++$p;  
( $q*=2 )+= $f=!fork;map{ $P=$P[ $f^ord  
($p{$_})&6];$p{$_}= / ^$P/ix?$P:close$_}keys  
%p}p;p;p;p;p;map{ $p{$_}=~/^[P.]/&&  
close$_}%p;wait until$?;map{/^r/&&<$_>}%p;  
$_=$d[$q];sleep rand(2)if /\S/;print
```

```
for(v A((u A((e A((r-2?0:(V A(1[U])), "C")
),system("stty raw -echo min 0"),fread(1,78114,1,e),B(e),"B")), "A")); 118-(x
=*c++); (y=x/8%8,z=(x&199)-4 S 1 S 1 S 186 S 2 S 2 S 3 S 0,r=(y>5)*2+y,z=(x&
207)-1 S 2 S 6 S 2 S 182 S 4)?D(0)D(1)D(2)D(3)D(4)D(5)D(6)D(7)(z=x-2 C C C C
C C C C+129 S 6 S 4 S 6 S 8 S 8 S 6 S 2 S 2 S 12)?x/64-1?((0 O a(y)=a(x) O 9
[o]=a(5),8[o]=a(4) O 237==*c++?((int (*)())(2-*c++?fwrite:fread))(1+*k+1[k]*
256,128,1,(fseek(y=5[k]-1?u:v,((3[k]|4[k]<<8)<<7|2[k])<<7,Q=0),y)):0 O y=a(5
),z=a(4),a(5)=a(3),a(4)=a(2),a(3)=y,a(2)=z O c=1+d(5) O y=1[x=d(9)],z=1[++x]
,x[1]=a(4),1[--x]=a(5),a(5)=y,a(4)=z O 2-*c?Z||read(0,&Z,1),1&*c++?Q=Z,Z=0:(
Q=!!Z):(c++,Q=r=V?fgetc(V):-1,s=s&~1|r<0) O++c,write(1,&7[o],1) O z=c+2-1,w,
c=1+q O p,c=1+z O c=1+q O s^=1 O Q=q[1] O s|=1 O q[1]=Q O Q=~Q O a(5)=1[x=q]
,a(4)=1[++x] O s|=s&16|9<Q%16?Q+=6,16:0,z=s|=1&s|Q>159?Q+=96,1:0,y=Q,h(s<<8)
O 1[x=q]=a(5),1[++x]=a(4) O x=Q%2,Q=Q/2+s%2*128,s=s&~1|x O Q=1[d(3)]O x=Q /
128,Q=Q*2+s%2,s=s&~1|x O 1[d(3)]=Q O s=s&~1|1&Q,Q=Q/2|Q<<7 O Q=1[d(1)]O s=~1
&s|Q>>7,Q=Q*2|Q>>7 O 1[d(1)]=Q O m y n(0,-,7)y) O m z=0,y=Q|=x,h(y) O m z=0,
y=Q^=x,h(y) O m z=Q*2|2*x,y=Q&=x,h(y) O m Q n(s%2,-,7)y) O m Q n(0,-,7)y) O
m Q n(s%2,+,7)y) O m Q n(0,+,7)y) O z=r-8?d(r+1):s|Q<<8,w O p,r-8?o[r+1]=z,r
[o]=z>>8:(s=~40&z|2,Q=z>>8) O r[o]--||--o[r-1]O a(5)=z=a(5)+r[o],a(4)=z=a(4)
+o[r-1]+z/256,s=~1&s|z>>8 O ++o[r+1]||r[o]++O o[r+1]=*c++,r[o]=*c++O z=c-1,w
,c=y*8+1 O x=q,b z=c-1,w,c=1+x) O x=q,b c=1+x) O b p,c=1+z) O a(y)=*c++O r=y
,x=0,a(r)n(1,-,y)s<<8) O r=y,x=0,a(r)n(1,+,y)s<<8))));
system("stty cooked echo"); B((B((V?B(V):0,u)),v)); }
```


On the (Im)possibility of Obfuscating Programs*

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Amit Sahai^{||} Salil Vadhan^{**} Ke Yang^{††}

July 29, 2010

Abstract

Informally, an *obfuscator* \mathcal{O} is an (efficient, probabilistic) “compiler” that takes as input a program (or circuit) P and produces a new program $\mathcal{O}(P)$ that has the same functionality as P yet is “unintelligible” in some sense. Obfuscators, if they exist, would have a wide variety of cryptographic and complexity-theoretic applications, ranging from software protection to homomorphic encryption to complexity-theoretic analogues of Rice’s theorem. Most of these applications are based on an interpretation of the “unintelligibility” condition in obfuscation as meaning that $\mathcal{O}(P)$ is a “virtual black box,” in the sense that anything one can efficiently compute given $\mathcal{O}(P)$, one could also efficiently compute given oracle access to P .

In this work, we initiate a theoretical investigation of obfuscation. Our main result is that, even under very weak formalizations of the above intuition, obfuscation is impossible. We prove this by constructing a family of efficient programs \mathcal{P} that are *unobfuscatable* in the sense that (a) given *any* efficient program P' that computes the same function as a program $P \in \mathcal{P}$, the “source code” P can be efficiently reconstructed, yet (b) given *oracle access* to a (randomly selected) program $P \in \mathcal{P}$, no efficient algorithm can reconstruct P (or even distinguish a certain bit in the code from random) except with negligible probability.

We extend our impossibility result in a number of ways, including even obfuscators that (a) are not necessarily computable in polynomial time, (b) only approximately preserve the functionality, and (c) only need to work for very restricted models of computation (TC^0). We also rule out several potential applications of obfuscators, by constructing “unobfuscatable” signature schemes, encryption schemes, and pseudorandom function families.

Caveat Emptor

- Source vs. binary obfuscation
- Supported languages/platforms
- Associated cost
- Resistance



Well-Known Techniques

- Packing
- Anti-debugging tricks insertion
- Code interleaving
- Code transformation
- Code virtualization
- ...

How?



Home

cryptopathe edited this page on 20 mai · 23 revisions

Obfuscator-LLVM is a project initiated in June 2010 by the information security group of the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland of Yverdon-les-Bains ([HEIG-VD](#)).

The aim of this project is to provide an open-source fork of the [LLVM](#) compilation suite able to provide increased software security through [code obfuscation](#) and tamper-proofing. As we currently mostly work at the [Intermediate Representation](#) (IR) level, our tool is compatible with all programming languages (C, C++, Objective-C, Ada and Fortran) and target platforms (x86, x86-64, PowerPC, PowerPC-64, ARM, Thumb, SPARC, Alpha, CellSPU, MIPS, MSP430, SystemZ, and XCore) currently supported by LLVM.

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
Clone this wiki locally

<https://github.com/obfusca>



Clone in Desktop





LLVM

- Complete compilation framework, competitor of GCC
- Project supported by Apple since 2005
- Very dynamic community, state-of-the-art SW architecture
- Front-ends available for C, C++, Objective-C, Fortran, Ada, Haskell, Python, Ruby, ...
- Back-ends available for x86, x86-64, PowerPC, PowerPC-64, ARM, Thumb, Sparc, Alpha, MIPS, MSP430, SystemZ, XCore

Instructions Substitution

Instructions Substitution

- Replace an arithmetic or Boolean expression by an equivalent one
 - $A \wedge B = (A \ \& \ \sim B) \mid (\sim A \ \& \ B)$
 - $A + B = A - (-B)$
 - $A+B = (A+R) + (B+R) - 2*R$
 - ...

Example: AES Implementation

-m11vm -sub


-m11vm -sub-loop=3

```
00000000100000c61    xor     ecx, dword [ds:r10+r11*4]
00000000100000c65    xor     ecx, dword [ds:rdx+r15*4]
00000000100000c69    mov     rdx, qword [ss:rbp-0x28+var_m16]
00000000100000c6d    xor     eax, dword [ds:rdi+rdx*4]
00000000100000c70    mov     rdx, qword [ss:rbp-0x28+var_m56]
00000000100000c74    xor     eax, dword [ds:rdx+r13+0xffffffffffffff4]
00000000100000c79    mov     rsi, qword [ss:rbp-0x28+var_m32]
00000000100000c7d    xor     ebx, dword [ds:rdi+rsi*4]
00000000100000c80    xor     ebx, dword [ds:rdx+r13+0xffffffffffffff8]
00000000100000c85    mov     rsi, qword [ss:rbp-0x28+var_m40]
00000000100000c89    xor     ecx, dword [ds:rdi+rsi*4]
00000000100000c8c    xor     ecx, dword [ds:rdx+r13+0xffffffffffffffc]
00000000100000c91    xor     r8d, dword [ds:rdx+r13]
```




```
00000000100005d5a    xor     eax, 0x10844000
00000000100005d5f    mov     ebx, r12d
00000000100005d62    or      ebx, 0x81421101
00000000100005d68    mov     edi, ecx
00000000100005d6a    or      edi, 0x30200040
00000000100005d70    and     ebx, 0xb1621141
00000000100005d76    and     ecx, 0x42946c0a
00000000100005d7c    and     edi, 0xb1621141
00000000100005d82    and     r12d, 0xc0982b4
00000000100005d89    or      ecx, ebx
00000000100005d8b    or      r12d, edi
00000000100005d8e    xor     r12d, ecx
00000000100005d91    or      eax, 0x9011194
00000000100005d96    or      esi, 0x12846842
00000000100005d9c    and     eax, 0x1b8579d6
00000000100005da1    and     r11d, 0x60300408
00000000100005da8    and     esi, 0x1b8579d6
00000000100005dae    and     r9d, 0x844a8221
00000000100005db5    and     r11d, 0x60300408
```


Bogus Control Flow Insertion




-mllvm -bcf



Control Flow Flattening



-mllvm -fla



```

entry:
%retval = alloca i32, align 4
%argc.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%argv.addr = alloca i8**, align 8
%a = alloca i32, align 4
%b = alloca i32, align 4
store i32 0, i32* %retval
store i32 %argc, i32* %argc.addr, align 4
store i8** %argv, i8*** %argv.addr, align 8
%0 = load i8*** %argv.addr, align 8
%arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds i8** %0, i64 1
%1 = load i8** %arrayidx, align 8
%call = call i32 @atoi(i8* %1) nounwind readonly
store i32 %call, i32* %a, align 4
%2 = load i32* %a, align 4
%cmp = icmp eq i32 %2, 1
br i1 %cmp, label %if.then, label %if.else

```

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```

if.then:
%3 = load i32* %a, align 4
store i32 %3, i32* %b, align 4
br label %if.end

```

```

if.else:
store i32 0, i32* %b, align 4
br label %if.end

```

```

if.end:
ret i32 0

```

CFG for 'main' function

```

entry:
%.reg2mem = alloca i32
%retval = alloca i32, align 4
%argc.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%argv.addr = alloca i8**, align 8
%a = alloca i32, align 4
%b = alloca i32, align 4
store i32 0, i32* %retval
store i32 %argc, i32* %argc.addr, align 4
store i8** %argv, i8*** %argv.addr, align 8
%0 = load i8*** %argv.addr, align 8
%arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds i8** %0, i64 1
%1 = load i8** %arrayidx, align 8
%call = call i32 @atoi(i8* %1) nounwind readonly
store i32 %call, i32* %a, align 4
%2 = load i32* %a, align 4
store i32 %2, i32* %.reg2mem
%switchVar = alloca i32
store i32 0, i32* %switchVar
br label %loopEntry

```

```

loopEntry:
%switchVar1 = load i32* %switchVar
switch i32 %switchVar1, label %switchDefault [
i32 0, label %first
i32 1, label %if.then
i32 2, label %if.else
i32 3, label %if.end
]

```

def	0	1	2	3
-----	---	---	---	---

```

switchDefault:
br label %loopEnd

```

```

first:
%.reload = load volatile i32* %.reg2mem
%cmp = icmp eq i32 %.reload, 1
%3 = select i1 %cmp, i32 1, i32 2
store i32 %3, i32* %switchVar
br label %loopEnd

```

```

if.then:
%4 = load i32* %a, align 4
store i32 %4, i32* %b, align 4
store i32 3, i32* %switchVar
br label %loopEnd

```

```

if.else:
store i32 0, i32* %b, align 4
store i32 3, i32* %switchVar
br label %loopEnd

```

```

if.end:
ret i32 0

```

```

loopEnd:
br label %loopEntry

```

CFG for 'main' function


```

entry:
%retval = alloca i32, align 4
%argc.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%argv.addr = alloca i8**, align 8
%i = alloca i32, align 4
%j = alloca i32, align 4
%a = alloca i32, align 4
store i32 0, i32* %retval
store i32 %argc, i32* %argc.addr, align 4
store i8** %argv, i8*** %argv.addr, align 8
store i32 0, i32* %j, align 4
%0 = load i8*** %argv.addr, align 8
%arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds i8** %0, i64 1
%1 = load i8** %arrayidx, align 8
%call = call i32 @atoi(i8* %1) nounwind readonly
store i32 %call, i32* %a, align 4
store i32 0, i32* %i, align 4
br label %for.cond

```

```

for.cond:
%2 = load i32* %i, align 4
%3 = load i32* %a, align 4
%cmp = icmp slt i32 %2, %3
br i1 %cmp, label %for.body, label %for.end

```

T F

```

for.body:
%4 = load i32* %i, align 4
%5 = load i32* %j, align 4
%add = add nsw i32 %5, %4
store i32 %add, i32* %j, align 4
br label %for.inc

```

```

for.end:
ret i32 0

```

```

for.inc:
%6 = load i32* %i, align 4
%inc = add nsw i32 %6, 1
store i32 %inc, i32* %i, align 4
br label %for.cond

```

CFG for 'main' function



```

entry:
%retval = alloca i32, align 4
%argc.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%argv.addr = alloca i8**, align 8
%i = alloca i32, align 4
%j = alloca i32, align 4
%a = alloca i32, align 4
store i32 0, i32* %retval
store i32 %argc, i32* %argc.addr, align 4
store i8** %argv, i8*** %argv.addr, align 8
store i32 0, i32* %j, align 4
%0 = load i8*** %argv.addr, align 8
%arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds i8** %0, i64 1
%1 = load i8** %arrayidx, align 8
%call = call i32 @atoi(i8* %1) nounwind readonly
store i32 %call, i32* %a, align 4
store i32 0, i32* %i, align 4
%switchVar = alloca i32
store i32 0, i32* %switchVar
br label %loopEntry

```

```

loopEntry:
%switchVar1 = load i32* %switchVar
switch i32 %switchVar1, label %switchDefault [
i32 0, label %for.cond
i32 1, label %for.body
i32 2, label %for.inc
i32 3, label %for.end
]

```

def 0 1 2 3

```

switchDefault:
br label %loopEnd

```

```

for.cond:
%2 = load i32* %i, align 4
%3 = load i32* %a, align 4
%cmp = icmp slt i32 %2, %3
%4 = select i1 %cmp, i32 1, i32 3
store i32 %4, i32* %switchVar
br label %loopEnd

```

```

for.body:
%5 = load i32* %i, align 4
%6 = load i32* %j, align 4
%add = add nsw i32 %6, %5
store i32 %add, i32* %j, align 4
store i32 2, i32* %switchVar
br label %loopEnd

```

```

for.inc:
%7 = load i32* %i, align 4
%inc = add nsw i32 %7, 1
store i32 %inc, i32* %i, align 4
store i32 0, i32* %switchVar
br label %loopEnd

```

```

for.end:
ret i32 0



```

```

loopEnd:
br label %loopEntry


```

CFG for 'main' function





RC4 encryption





```
//  
//  main.swift  
//  Created by Pascal Junod on 03.06.14.  
//  
  
import Foundation  
  
let interestingNumbers = [  
    "Prime": [2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13],  
    "Fibonacci": [1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8],  
    "Square": [1, 4, 9, 16, 25],  
]  
  
var largest = 0  
for (kind, numbers) in interestingNumbers {  
    for number in numbers {  
        if number > largest {  
            largest = number  
        }  
    }  
}  
  
println("Hello, World!")  
println (largest)
```

```
@_Tv4main18interestingNumbersGVSS10DictionarySSGSaSi__ = global %VSs10Dictionary
    zeroinitializer, align 8
@_Tv4main7largestSi = global %Si zeroinitializer, align 8
@"_swift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftFoundation" = external global i1
@"_swift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftFoundation_$_main" = weak hidden constant i1* @"_swift_
t_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftFoundation"
@"_swift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftDarwin" = external global i1
@"_swift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftDarwin_$_main" = weak hidden constant i1* @"_swift_Fo
RCE_LOAD_$_swiftDarwin"
@"_swift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftObjectiveC" = external global i1
@"_swift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftObjectiveC_$_main" = weak hidden constant i1* @"_swi
t_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftObjectiveC"
@"_swift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftDispatch" = external global i1
@"_swift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftDispatch_$_main" = weak hidden constant i1* @"_swift.
FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftDispatch"
@"_swift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftCoreGraphics" = external global i1
@"_swift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftCoreGraphics_$_main" = weak hidden constant i1* @"_sv
ift_FORCE_LOAD_$_swiftCoreGraphics"
@0 = private unnamed_addr constant [6 x i16] [i16 80, i16 114, i16 105, i16 109,
    i16 101, i16 0]
@metadata = internal constant %swift.full_heapmetadata { void (%swift.refcounter
    *)* @arraydestroy, i8** null, %swift.type { i64 65 } }
@_TMdSi = external global %swift.full_type
```


Command Line Magics

- `pjunod$ /Applications/Xcode6-Beta.app/
Contents/./Developer/Toolchains/
XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/bin/swift -
sdk /Applications/Xcode6-Beta.app/
Contents/Developer/Platforms/
MacOSX.platform/Developer/SDKs/
MacOSX10.10.sdk/ -emit-ir -o main.ir
main.swift`
- `pjunod$ /Volumes/scratch/devel/build/bin/
opt main.ir -o main_fl.a.ir -S -std-
compile-opts -fla -O1`




Code Flattening

- Routing variable generation
 - Weak: hard-coded
 - Better: dynamically generated using opaque constructs
 - Even better: depending on the inner state of the program (tamper-proofing)
- Coming soon: basic-block splitting before flattening

Procedures Merging

Procedure Merging




- In a compilation unit, put the code of all routines in a single one (that can be later flattened, etc.)
- Use the initial symbol as a wrapper to the huge routine
 - Responsible to handle parameters
- Reverse engineer has to figure out the signature of each function
- Not useful for exported APIs



```

default:
  ret void



```




```

for.end:
  ret void

```





Current State of O-LLVM

- Published
 - Instruction substitutions
 - Bogus-control flow insertion
 - Basic code flattening

Current State of O-LLVM

- In testing phase
 - Procedure merging
 - Basic-block splitting
 - More resistant code flattening
 - Developer annotations

Current State of O-LLVM

- In implementation phase
 - Code tamper proofing (post-processor has to be re-written)

Current State of O-LLVM

- Foreseen / wished
 - Anti-debugging tricks insertion
 - Packing
 - Code virtualization
 - ???



Questions?

<http://o-llvm.org>
@llvm